







In December 2009, after several years of negotiations, agreement was reached 
between four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar and Bahrain, to abandon their existing currencies in favour of a new single 
currency, yet to be named. The other two GCC members, UAE and Oman, may 
join later. The new currency is projected to be in operation by 2015 and the GCC 
argues that it will eliminate exchange rate risk between the countries, promote 
regional competitiveness and enhance intra-GCC trade and investment.
However, there is not much scope for the new currency to improve exchange rate 
certainty as GCC currencies are already closely aligned – a result of the fact that 
they have all effectively followed the US dollar, with minor departures, for the best 
part of three decades.
The Gulf currency may bring a small reduction in transactions costs between the 
GCC states, but there is much more to be gained from the further removal of 
trade barriers, the development of capital markets, and the adoption of more 
uniform subsidies and regulations. It might be argued that that new currency will 
act as a spur for these other market-improving measures. But these measures do 
not need the new currency and they can be adopted independently.
On the other hand, there may be an economic case for breaking the tie with 
the US dollar, which will be easier under the joint currency than with separate 
currencies.
THE EUrO AS A MODEl
One motivation for the Gulf currency is the apparent success of the euro. However, 
there are no claims that the euro has itself been of much help in improving the European 
Union’s ‘single market’. The euro is, above all, a political project, designed to promote 
the ideal of ‘ever closer union’ in Europe and its ‘success’ during the past 10 years is 








Saudi Arabia 379.5 28,687
GCC MU 606.3 32.687
Oman 52.3 3,418
UAE 228.6 4,798
GCC total 887.2 42,155
Eurozone 12,266.3 320,441
Table 1:
The Gulf region 
compared with 
the eurozone; 2009
GCC MU stands for GCC 
Monetary Union.
Source: IMF World 
Economic Outlook, 
October 2009 estimates
3The Gulf CurrenCy 
lessons from the euro
Although the Gulf-zone will be much smaller than the eurozone both in population 
and economic size (table 1), there is no doubt that the Gulf rulers are aware of 
the symbolic prestige of the euro and they are looking to the euro as the model 
for their own currency. There will be a single central bank, there are plans for 
entrance conditions which match the ‘convergence criteria’ applied to countries 
joining the euro, and implementation is to follow similar procedures with detailed 
planning handled by an independent Monetary Council that will later mutate into 
the central bank.
It is therefore ironic that the decision to proceed with the new Gulf currency has 
been made at a time when the euro is suffering its severest strains to date – which 
prompts consideration of whether the Gulf currency might also be vulnerable. 
The euro-system is currently threatened by doubt about the sustainability of the 
debts of several Southern eurozone governments and there is speculation that, 
without financial support from other governments or the IMF, there may be 
a return to national currencies. The focus at the moment is on Greece where 
government debt is 115% of GDP (table 2) and the budget deficit is 12.7% of 
GDP (an upwards revision from the figure in table 2). Comparable problems also 














Bahrain 24.2 -4.7 3.7
Kuwait 6.9 24.4 29.4
Qatar 12.6 9.0 10.8
S Arabia 14.5 1.2 4.1
GCC MU 13.1 2.4 9.9
Oman 4.4 4.1 -0.5
UAE 10.2 4.0 -1.6
GCC total 12.3 5.3 6.3
Germany 77.4 -4.2 2.9
Greece 114.9 -6.4 -10.0
Ireland 65.8 -12.1 -1.7
Italy 123.6 -5.6 -2.5
Portugal 83.7 -6.9 -9.9
Spain 59.3 -12.3 -6.0
Eurozone 84.6 -6.3 -0.1
Table 2:
Government finances 
and balance of 
payments, GCC 
and some eurozone 
countries; 2009




The immediate cause of these eurozone debts is, of course, the global financial 
crisis and the subsequent recession which have together led to appalling 
government debt positions not just in EU countries but also in others including the 
US and Britain. But for the eurozone countries, the problems run deeper and euro 
membership also makes them harder to solve. Government finances in Greece 
had already been in poor shape for years before it joined the euro, but its penalty 
for lax fiscal behaviour was a depreciating currency and a corresponding currency 
risk premium on its debts. When it joined in 2001 (reporting falsely optimistic 
figures for its budget deficit), it was rewarded with much lower interest costs on 
its national debt. 
Under the implicit guarantee of eurozone ‘solidarity’, Greece, Italy, and the others 
effectively imported Germany’s reputation for sound fiscal management. But, 
far from leading the Greeks to mend their ways, euro membership enabled its 
government to continue spending as before and even made this cheaper. The EU’s 
Stability Pact limit on budget deficits (max 3% of GDP) was supposed to enforce 
prudent fiscal behaviour, but it has never been a credible deterrent and it has been 
frequently flouted by large and small euro members.
Euro membership, however, brought with it the new penalty of short-term 
interest rates set by the European Central Bank and these have generally suited 
Germany rather better than the Southern eurozone countries. In the first few 
years, interest rates were too low for the Southerners, which increased inflation 
and led to a marked decline in competitiveness. Then in 2004-5, euro interest 
rates rose just when these countries needed it least. In 2008, boom turned to 
slump, exacerbated by the global economic downturn.
In 2009, all these malign influences – the world recession and financial crisis, 
previous inappropriate interest rates and continuing fiscal incontinence – combined 
to bankrupt the Greek government and, in differing degrees, those of Portugal, 
Spain and Ireland.
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WIll THE GUlF CUrrEnCy HAvE SIMIlAr PrOBlEMS?
At present, government debts in the GCC are small and, apart from Bahrain, all 
government budgets are in surplus (2009; table 2). The contrast with the troubled 
eurozone governments could hardly be greater. If the Stability Pact conditions of 
the eurozone are the relevant criteria (government deficits less than 3% of GDP; 










S Arabia 264.1 267.3
Oman 5.6 34.6
UAE 97.8 227.1
GCC tot 496.3 1494.2
However, a joint currency is a large commitment and all member countries need 
to be confident that the other members will continue with responsible fiscal 
behaviour in the future. In GCC countries, hydrocarbon duties provide the bulk of 
government revenues and the question has to be raised as to what will replace this 
when hydrocarbon reserves become depleted. This is a not a concern for Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar (table 3), provided that oil and gas prices do not fall significantly, 
but Bahrain and Oman (predicted to join the currency later) are less fortunate.
Diversification into other activities such as tourism and financial services is taking place 
in all GCC countries and there is discussion about developing new sources of taxation. 
But, even if sufficient revenue is raised, a potential difficulty arises with monetary 
policy. In present circumstances, the dollar peg has meant that GCC countries have, 
for years, been obliged to accept short-term interest rates that are close to the $ 
rates set by the US Federal reserve. This has not been an issue so far because the 
common dependence on oil has meant that the economic cycles of the Gulf states 
have been roughly in step. As some countries replace oil and gas production with 
other activities, their economic cycles may no longer coincide so well.
The single interest rate, which becomes locked in under a single currency, may 
then become a problem as in the eurozone where is has caused price levels to 
diverge across countries. Unfortunately, a single currency does not imply a single 
inflation rate, yet it does remove the option of currency deprecation as a means of 
restoring competitiveness after a country has suffered from inflation. Thus, when 
prices and wages in a country have become higher than elsewhere, this can only 
be corrected by relative reduction in those prices and wages, as is now painfully 
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THE CHAllEnGE IS POlITICAl
In the end – and here the euro comparison is relevant again – the longevity of the 
Gulf currency will depend crucially on the degree of political cohesion between 
the member states. To state the obvious, the usual arrangement throughout the 
world is that single currencies coincide with countries run by single governments. 
When the Soviet Union broke up, for instance, the countries of Eastern Europe 
that regained political independence were quick to re-establish monetary 
independence. The euro is clearly anomalous in this respect – its founding fathers 
believed that economic union would force the pace of political integration. It 
remains to be seen whether this, or the opposite, will be true.
Currencies tend to be national rather than super-national because there is a 
common legislature, labour mobility is greater within countries than internationally, 
governments usually have some power to impose discipline on overspending 
regions and there is scope for fiscal transfers between regions. In the United 
States, for example, if California is booming while Michigan is in slump, there is 
automatically a compensating transfer of resources through the tax system. This 
works in the US because it has a federal budget of some 20% of GDP, unlike the 
EU where the common budget is only 1% of GDP.
These caveats aside, current circumstances seem to be favourable for the 
establishment of a joint Gulf currency – at least as compared to the euro. GCC 
government finances are generally healthy, their business cycles are approximately 
in phase, they share a common culture and language, and co-operation between 
countries is increasing at several levels. But they do not share a government so 
the new currency could be vulnerable to the same forces that now endanger the 
euro. There needs to be enough commitment amongst all members both to abide 
by the rules and to help other members if they need it. As the largest economy 
and oil exporter, this responsibility will rest disproportionately on Saudi Arabia, 
although this would be shared with UAE if UAE and Oman join at a later date.
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SHOUlD THE DOllAr PEG BE MAInTAInED?
Initially, the new currency is expected to be tied to the US dollar, continuing the 
arrangement that is largely observed by the individual GCC countries at present. 
Once it is established, there is the possibility of breaking the dollar link in order to 
adopt a more appropriate external exchange rate regime – a change that would be 
harder for each country to make on its own.
For the most part, the peg to the US dollar has served well, being the currency 
of the GCC countries’ dominant hydrocarbon exports and of most of their large 
external assets. However, the dollar peg makes Gulf economies unnecessarily 
exposed to swings in the oil price (measured in dollars), and there are concerns 
that the recent weakness of the dollar against other major currencies contributed 
to inflation (this was the motive for Kuwait’s recent move to an undisclosed wider 
basket). This has given rise to a number of suggestions for alternative exchange 
rate regimes: a peg to a dollar-euro basket or a wider basket of currencies; tying 
the currency to the oil price; an adjustable dollar peg; a managed float or a free 
float.
The test of any exchange rate policy other than a free float is its credibility, 
implying that the managed float and the adjustable peg would be poor choices. 
In the absence of controls on the movement of foreign capital, any arrangement 
that builds in discretion for the monetary authority over exchange rates invites 
destabilising foreign exchange flows whenever there is a hint that the parity could 
be adjusted. Similarly, fixing the new currency to a wider basket is not ideal as it 
is vulnerable to expectations that the composition of the basket may be changed. 
For these reasons, a free float is likely to be the appropriate option and it has the 
additional advantage that it should partially smooth the flow of foreign earnings as 
the oil price fluctuates.
In conclusion, whatever exchange rate policy is finally adopted, it is clear that the 
GCC countries are better suited for a joint currency than the euro countries. And 
provided that the Gulf states are prepared to group together in forming something 
that more closely resembles a single government than at present, it should have a 
longer life expectancy than the euro. However, while the Gulf states might value 
the apparent prestige of their own joint currency, they should not expect it to be 
a significant factor in improving trade unless it drives other reforms.
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